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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. 1537
(U.S.2004) (holding the Clean Water Act requires National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits for point sources that convey
pollutants into navigable waters of the United States, though they do
not themselves produce any pollutants).
The South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD")
appealed summary judgment entered by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida as affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, regarding whether one of its facilities
required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The facility
was an SFWMD pump station that pumped water from a canal into a
wetlands conservation area in the Everglades. The canal and wetlands
conservation area were separated by a system of man-made levees,
having once been parts of a single watershed. SFWMD pumped water
from the canal, which carried pollutants from upstream surface runoff
and groundwater discharge, into the wetlands conservation area. The
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") brought the action to prevent
SFWMD from operating its pump station without an NPDES permit,
asserting that the pump station was a point source that added a
pollutant to the navigable waters of the United States.
SFWMD argued the pump station was not a point source for
purposes of determining whether the CWA required SFWMD to obtain
an NPDES permit for its operation because the pump station itself
generated no pollutants. The pollutants originated, rather, from
surface runoff and groundwater discharge along the canal, upstream
of the pump station. The district court disagreed. The CWA defines
"discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source," and defines "point source" as
"any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance ... from which
pollutants are or may be discharged." The district court found that, in
the absence of language concerning the generation of pollutants, the
pump station constituted a point source, as defined above, if it
discharged pollutants from one water body into another, even though
it did not generate those pollutants.
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SFWMD further argued that it did not discharge pollutants into
navigable waters because the canal and wetlands conservation area
were, in fact, a single water body, separated only by human
interference with natural movements of water. SFWMD contended
that, if it did not operate the pump station, one result would be that
the canal would flood, and the artificially separated canal and wetlands
conservation area would flow back together. The pump station was,
therefore, not the but-for cause of canal water entering the wetlands
conservation area. Rather, the pump station merely put the water
where it would flow naturally, if not for the intervening system of manmade levees. The Tribe conceded that, if the canal and wetlands
conservation area were not distinct bodies, and the pump station was
not the but-for cause of water moving from one to the other, then the
pump station did not require an NPDES permit. However, the Tribe
contended that, as a matter of fact, the two bodies were distinct, and
the pump station was the only reason water entered the wetlands
conservation area from the canal. On its own determination that canal
and the wetlands conservation area were distinct water bodies and that
the pump station was the but-for cause of their waters joining, the
district court granted summaryjudgment to the Tribe.
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court on both findings
and SFWMD appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari. The Court upheld the district court's holding that
the pump station was a point source that discharged a pollutant
because the CWA made "plain that the point source need only convey
the pollutant to navigable waters." As an example, the Court noted
that the CWA imposes NPDES requirements on municipal wastewater
treatment plants whose purpose is to "treat and discharge pollutants
added to water by others."
On the second point, however, the Court held that the district
court improperly granted summary judgment on the issue of whether
the canal and wetlands conservation area were "meaningfully distinct
water bodies," and remanded the case for further proceedings to
resolve that issue. The Court concluded that if SFWMD's factual
description of the canal, wetlands conservation area, and the
intervening man-made structures was correct, then its contention that
the canal and the wetlands conservation area were not meaningfully
distinct water bodies under the law would also be correct. At trial, the
parties did not dispute this point of law, but disputed whether the two
bodies were, in fact, meaningfully distinct. If they were not, the pump
station would not require an NPDES permit. The Court held that the
district court made its determination prematurely, disallowing valid
evidence contrary to its finding. Therefore, an unresolved factual
controversy remained, and the district court's summary judgment was
improper.
The Court did not resolve the issue, which SFWMD raised, of
whether the requirement of an NPDES permit turns on the question
of whether the two bodies are not distinct because "navigable waters of
the United States" refers to a unitary sum. The SFWMD argued that,
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because waters in the canal and in the wetlands conservation area were
both "navigable waters of the United States," the pump station could
not be said to "add" any pollutant to the nation's navigable waters,
whether or not it would otherwise constitute a point source. Because
SFWMD failed to raise the issue before the courts below, however, the
Court declined to address it, leaving it to SFWMD to raise it on
remand.
Owen Walker

Virginia v. Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 598 (U.S. 2003) (holding in absence of
express grant of regulatory authority in interstate compact and
arbitration award governing Potomac River, each state was free to
regulate activities only of its own citizens with regard to use of the
river, and Virginia did not lose sovereign riparian rights by acquiescing
to Maryland's regulation).
The Commonwealth of Virginia sought a declaration from the
United States Supreme Court that it had a right to withdraw water
from and construct improvements appurtenant to the Potomac River
free from the regulatory authority of the State of Maryland. Maryland
objected to the Special Master's report recommending that the Court
grant Virginia's requested relief. A majority of the Court overruled
Maryland's exceptions in a 7-2 ruling.
The Potomac forms much of the boundary between Maryland and
Virginia as it flows from the Appalachians to Chesapeake Bay. Both
Maryland and Virginia claimed ownership of the river under
conflicting seventeenth century royal charters.
Virginia ceded
ownership of the river to Maryland in its 1776 State Constitution, but
specifically excepted from cession "the free navigation and use of the
Rivers Potowmack and Pocomoke, and all improvements made on
Virginia's shores." However, in the same year Maryland passed a
constitutional resolution rejecting Virginia's constitutional reservation.
In 1785, Maryland and Virginia appointed commissioners to
resolve their differences. The commissioners agreed on the Mount
Vernon Compact ("1785 Compact"), which the legislatures of both
states ratified. The 1785 Compact provided that the Potomac "shall be
considered as a common highway, for the purpose of navigation and
commerce.., and that all laws regulating fishing and navigation shall
be made with the mutual consent and approbation of both states."
Further, the 1785 Compact explained "the citizens of each state
respectively shall have full property in the shores of Potowmack river
[sic] ... and the privilege of making and carrying out wharves and
other improvements, so as not to obstruct navigation of the River."
The 1785 Compact did not, however, determine the precise
boundary line in the river. After nearly a century of conflict, the states
submitted the boundary dispute to arbitration.
The arbitration

